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In The Economics of Climate Change, Nicholas Stern (2007:1) refers to 
atmospheric quality as a global public good (GPG) and to climate change as “the 
greatest example of market failure we have ever seen.” Amid the burgeoning 
social-science literature on climate finance, however, studies that use the GPG 
concept as their analytical lens remain rare.  
 
This chapter explores whether considering the GPG properties of climate change 
provides added value when examining issues of climate finance.1 Could the GPG 
lens improve our understanding of climate finance? More importantly, would it 
allow us to discover new ways to meet the challenge of climate change by 
fostering global sustainable growth and development, as stipulated in Agenda 
2030 and the Paris Agreement?2 
 
These questions are explored below in two stages. Section I introduces the GPG 
concept, highlighting some of the ways GPGs differ from national public goods 
                                                            
1 Given that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) does not offer a 
definition of “climate change,” the 2015 report of the UNFCCC’s Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) offers a 
definition that, in the words of its authors, tries to capture the common elements among the definitions 
adopted by data collectors and aggregators. According to this definition, climate finance “aims at reducing 
emissions, and enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases and aims at reducing the vulnerability of, and maintaining 
and increasing the resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate impacts” (ibid: 5). As 
elaborated on the “Climate finance” page of the UNFCCC website, climate finance may include local, national or 
transnational financing and be drawn from public, private, and alternative sources of financing. See 
http://unfccc.int/focus/climate_finance/items/7001.php/ (accessed April 24, 2016). 
2 Agenda 2030 was adopted in September 2015 by all 193 Member States of the United Nations. It sets forth 17 
main goals that the international community decided to pursue over the next 15 years to end extreme poverty, 
fight inequality and injustice, and protect the planet. For the full text of Agenda 2030 see 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E/ . The Paris Agreement was adopted 
in December of the same year. It is the outcome document of the 21st session of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In its opening paragraphs, the Agreement emphasizes “the intrinsic 
relationship that climate change actions, responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable 
development and eradication of poverty” (ibid.: 21) 
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(NPGs), as those could indicate possible inhibitors and facilitators of climate 
finance. Against this background, Section II presents four issues that come into 
focus and appear in a new light when examining climate finance through the lens 
of GPGs: (1) the differences and synergies between climate finance and 
development finance; (2) the risk of market and state failure in pursuing and 
financing climate change mitigation; (3) the importance of intra-generational 
fairness; and (4) the current lack of integrated provision-path analysis and  
management.  
 
Two main findings emerge from the analysis. First, international public climate 
finance (IPCF) is an important inhibitor of overall climate finance.3 Second, many 
of the factors constraining climate finance are not climate-specific but rather 
GPG-specific. They affect GPGs across the board and reflect a basic problem of 
institutional lock-in, whereby national and international governance systems 
have not yet been adjusted to address GPG-type policy challenges efficiently and 
effectively.   
 
The final section thus concludes that enhancing climate finance might require a 
two-pronged approach—developing the incipient effort in this paper to apply 
the GPG lens to climate issues while building a general theory of GPG provision 
and finance, of which only the initial stage is underway.           
 
Therefore, the task of clarifying GPG characteristics is taken up next.      
           
I  Introducing Global Public Goods 
 
Scholars commonly define a GPG simply as a good that differs in geographic 
and/or temporal reach from an NPG, the type of public good (PG) on which 
conventional public economic theory focuses. Such a definition misses two 
important points, however. First, as Meghnad Desai (2003) argues, we cannot 
take the generic PG definition of public goods as settled; second, the wider reach 
of GPGs’ benefits and costs is but one of several dimensions in which NPGs and 
GPGs differ. Moreover, as the discussion below makes clear, the other, neglected 
features appear to be precisely those that might explain why many GPGs, 
including climate change, are allowed to linger for so long in well-documented 
                                                            
3 The term “international public finance” refers to public revenue channeled to bilateral or multilateral climate-
related programs and projects. 
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states of worsening underprovision, even though possible courses of corrective 
action are known but adopted only hesitantly.  
 
It is therefore useful to, first, discuss the generic PG concept and, second, identify 
the key distinguishing features of GPGs.4 
 
1—THE GENERIC DEFINITION OF PUBLIC GOODS: According to standard economic 
theory, PGs are marked by non-rivalry and/or non-excludability in consumption. 
When possessing both these properties, they are said to be “pure public in 
consumption;” when exhibiting only one such characteristic, they are described 
as “impure public in consumption.” Goods that are fully or partially rival and/or 
excludable are referred to as “pure private” or “impure private” goods.  
 
Besides agreeing on these basic elements of the definition of PG, scholars also 
agree that, generally, a good’s publicness or privateness in consumption is not 
an innate property but a social construct—the result of a socio-cultural or 
political choice. However, they differ about how impure public a good can be and 
still be considered public and which of the two properties (non-rivalry or non-
excludability) matters most in classifying a good as public. Another open 
question is whether to attach a value connotation to PGs. While some scholars, 
including textbook authors, still refer to PGs as “beneficial” or “to be enjoyed by 
all,” others take a more empirical, value-neutral position, recognizing that, as 
people’s living conditions tend to vary widely, their preferences for certain PGs 
are also likely to vary.  
 
The definition of generic PG used in this paper is the value-neutral two-tier 
definition presented in Box 1. This definition distinguishes between a good’s 
potential for being in the public in consumption (i.e., available for all or for 
anyone to be affected by it) and its actual publicness (i.e., being de facto non-
excludable or non-exclusive). 
 
Box 1 close to here 
 
Conventionally, PGs have been considered mainly from their consumption side. 
Due to their publicness in consumption, they have been seen as one of the 
conditions that cause market failure and may thus justify state intervention in 
                                                            
4 For a more detailed discussion on these different types of PG, see, among others, Kaul et al. (2003) and Kaul 
et al. (2016). 
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the economy.5 However, this conclusion rests on the assumption that individual 
actors are selfish and rational and would therefore free-ride in the presence of a 
public good (i.e., let someone else provide the good and enjoy it for free). As a 
result, PGs became an integral component of the theory of the state and the 
economics of the public sector. For a long time, only limited attention was paid 
to their production.6 The state was expected to take care of that and did, in fact, 
play a relatively significant role in PG production from the 1950s to the 1970s, 
when the foundations of conventional public economics and, as one of its core 
elements, those of conventional PG theory were laid.7  
 
Advancing privatization and economic liberalization have turned PGs into multi-
actor, sometimes even voluntarily or privately provided, products. It is now quite 
common for scholars to differentiate among PGs according to their consumption 
properties and their “social aggregation technology,” depending on whether 
their production is a summation, weakest-link, or best-shot process. 8 
Increasingly, scholars not only consider the overall supply technology of a good 
but also examine the good to identify its various building blocks and any external 
forces that may impact its availability. Public goods are now accepted as being 
public in consumption and provision.   
   
2— KEY FEAUTURES OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: As mentioned, many scholars assume 
that the difference between NPGs and GPGs lies mainly in their different 
geographic and temporal reach. The benefits and costs of GPGs are viewed as 
spanning the world and, in many instances, several generations as well. This 
explains why the terms “inter-national PG,” “trans-national PG,” and “GPG” are 
often used interchangeably. However, the implications of a PG’s worldwide and 
multi-generational reach reveal that the difference between NPGs and GPGs is 
                                                            
5 The conditions that make markets fail usually include (besides public conditions) imperfect competition, 
externalities, incomplete markets, imperfect information, and macroeconomic disturbances (Stiglitz and 
Rosengard 2015: 93). Externalities arise when individual actors take an action that generates spillover effects 
into the public domain for which they do not bear the full costs or from which they do not reap the full 
benefits. Thus, externalities are important inputs into PGs and are explicitly referred to here only when the 
context warrants it.           
6 Public good provision can be viewed as composed of two different though closely interrelated policy 
processes: (i) the political process of deciding which goods to provide, which policy paths to follow, and how to 
share the costs and benefits; and (ii) the implementation or production process of mobilizing and assembling all 
requisite inputs, including the required financial resources.    
7 For example, for early contributions to the state-centric approach to PG provision, see, among others, 
Musgrave (1969, 1989 [1973]) and Samuelson (1954, 1955). Notable early contributions on private and 
voluntary PG provision include Buchanan (1954, 1975).  On these contrasting visions, see also Buchanan and 
Musgrave (1999).     
8 The concept of “social aggregation technology” was introduced by Hirshleifer (1983). For its further 
refinement and application, see Cornes and Sandler 1996[1986] and Sandler (1998). 
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more profound and that the terms “inter-national” and “trans-national” may be 
inadequate, and may even conceal the essential differences. 
 
To elaborate, a good’s being global public in consumption implies that it 
confronts different countries and population groups with the sameness and 
indivisibility of supply, ignoring any differences in living conditions and 
preferences, which also tend to be wider in a global than in a national context. 
Moreover, in many instances, GPGs penetrate countries without asking for 
permission. They are not just waiting at the inter-national level and spanning 
across countries, patiently waiting like Weisbrodian option-value goods to be 
accessed, should potential users wish to do so.9 Rather, they just transgress 
national borders, affecting, for better or worse, the welfare and well-being of 
countries or particular population groups within them. Thus, GPGs may be 
perceived as running counter to one of the basic principles on which the current 
world order is based: non-interference by outside forces in internal national 
affairs. 
 
Moreover, GPGs run counter to a second fundamental world-order principle: 
national policymaking sovereignty. Like their national counterparts, GPGs are 
public in provision, yet publicness in provision means that, if a country wants to 
alter the supply level or the design and shape of a GPG, unilateral action or 
forming a small group of like-minded states may not suffice. The country may be 
compelled to seek the cooperation of others; GPGs that follow a summation 
process confront states with a compulsion to engage in effective international 
cooperation.          
 
Moreover, a good’s global publicness in consumption often affects not only 
countries but also areas beyond national jurisdiction, including many global 
natural commons such as the high seas and the atmosphere. The systemic 
integrity requirements of these commons may demand more in terms of 
corrective action than all states together are willing to do for them.  
 
Further, some GPGs are stock-variables, whose availability changes slowly over 
long periods of time so that their present supply level depends on what 
                                                            
9 Examples of Weisbrodian option-value goods are public parks and hospitals. While people may be uncertain 
about when or whether at all they may use these goods, should they ever wish to do so, the goods are there 
for them. For a more detailed discussion of this type of goods, see Holtmann (1999) and Weisbrod (1964).     
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happened in the past, and their future supply may be determined by policy 
actions taken today (Nordhaus 2006).10  
 
Thus, as Box 2 illustrates, GPGs have a horizontal (geographic and temporal) 
dimension and a vertical (border-transgressing and interdependence-
generating) dimension. To capture both, and as many global challenges have 
national and international or transnational dimensions (and often inter-
temporal ones), it seems appropriate to refer to them as global public goods 
(GPGs) and to use “global” to denote the goods’ multi-dimensional and (by 
implication) complex nature: they span the world and, possibly, also several 
generations, cutting across several levers of governance and are thus most likely 
of concern to a number of diverse actor groups.  
 
Box 2 close to here      
 
That said, however, what does the fact that climate change is such a GPG-type 
issue tell us about climate finance? 
 
The next section will examine this question. 
    
 II Climate Finance Seen Through the Lens of Global Public Goods  
 
The fact that both climate change (the problem) and climate change mitigation 
and adaptation (the policy outcome to be achieved) possess GPG characteristics 
has important implications for our understanding of and policy practice for 
climate finance. This is evident from the following analysis, which shows 
concerning four aspects of climate finance that employing the GPG lens makes a 
difference. The four aspects pertain to (1) climate finance as distinct from 
development finance; (2) the risk of market and state failure in providing climate 
finance; (3) the importance of intra-generational fairness as a means of 
strengthening actors’ willingness to “get the price of international cooperation 
right;” and (4) the need for a more genuinely global, integrated, and 
comprehensive approach to the analysis and management of the provision and 
financing of climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
 
                                                            
10 Important is that stock variables like climate change raise not only inter-generational equity issues but also 
inter-country issues, as we can see from the discussions on the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capacities (CBDRRC) and the linked issue of who ought to take leadership in 
addressing this challenge. See, Brunnée and Streck (2013); CESR and TWN (2015) and Pauw et al. (2014).  
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1 CLIMATE FINANCE AS DISTINCT FROM DEVELOPMENT FINANCE  
 
In their classic book, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, Richard A. Musgrave 
and Peggy B. Musgrave (1989 [1973]) distinguish between an efficiency branch 
and an equity branch of national public finance. While the former is concerned 
with the efficient allocation of resources to the provision of NPGs, including the 
management of externalities, the latter concerns how to support society in 
realizing what it considers a fair or just state of distribution. In line with this 
distinction, one could say that IPCF constitutes the international component of 
the efficiency branch of global public finance and that external official 
development finance (EODF) is the international extension of the equity branch 
of national public finance.11  
 
One could say this because climate change and its mitigation are global-public in 
consumption and production, concerning virtually all countries and all people. 
When actors come together to discuss and agree on how to address this issue, 
the good to be produced ought to be at the center of their debates, including 
questions such as which strategy to choose to get to the desired policy outcome 
and how to share the costs and benefits of taking corrective action among the 
concerned parties. In contrast, when actors come together to discuss 
development, their focus would need to be on a particular country or group of 
countries like, for example, least developed countries, considering that country 
conditions vary and, as past experience has shown, effective development 
assistance requires taking national circumstances into account.12    
 
Table 1 displays the significant differences between IPCF and EODF, which, if 
ignored, could lead to misallocations and negatively impact both branches.  
 
                                                            
11 For listings of the finance streams counted as ‘public’ and ‘private’ in the field of climate finance, see CPI 
(2015); OECD and CPI (2015); and UNFCCC/SCF (2014); and for the categorization of development finance 
according to these criteria, see https://data.oecd.org/drf/other-official-flows-oof.htm/. EODF includes official 
development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF), which have a grant element of less than 25% and, 
therefore, do not qualify as ODA. See, OECD (2016). Other official flows (OOF) (indicator). doi: 
10.1787/6afef3df-en (Accessed on 28 April 2016). Simply put, the public component of IPCF and EODF are flows 
that have budgetary implications for the contributing country.   
12 A country-specific approach to development assistance does not preclude policy dialogue between the 
national authorities and their external partners about what are the most promising approaches to fostering the 
country’s national development. It just implies avoiding over-standardized policy prescriptions. Yet, when 
actors demand or offer to supply inputs to a GPG like climate change mitigation and adaptation, it would be 
important to be specific and, even, prescriptive about the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the input 
in question in order to facilitate a smooth functioning of exchanges such as the trading of certified emission-
reduction credits. We will revert to this issue below, in point II.3.  
8 
 
Undoubtedly, synergy effects, too, appear between the two branches. As also 
shown in Table 1, effective development depends on effective climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, which, in turn, depend on effective development. 
Precisely due to the benefits of these synergies, however, it is important not to 
promote one goal at the expense of the other, as happens at present.13  
 
Table 1 close to here 
 
For example, OECD/DAC makes special efforts to document the increasing 
amount of EODF from its member states that flows into supporting climate 
change mitigation and adaptation projects and programs.  In 2013-14 bilateral 
climate-related ODA commitments reached on average per year US$ 25 billion 
or 18% of total bilateral ODA up from 4% in 2003-4 (OECD/DAC 2015). This is 
justified by the argument that, at the country level, it is difficult to distinguish 
between development assistance and climate finance. True, at the country level, 
the IPCF and EODF streams often come together and are, even, pooled with 
domestic public, private and other types of finance.  
 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure that each funding stream flows to where it can 
best be used and to demonstrate that IPCF consists of new and additional 
resources, as repeatedly stipulated in international agreements, it would be 
desirable and possible clearly to distinguish between them – upstream. When 
preparing their national budget, all donor countries could allocate IPCF to one 
budget line and EODF to another line. Development assistance could be 
distributed, via bilateral, multilateral and other channels, to qualifying countries 
according to defined allocation criteria; and it would be the recipient developing 
country, who would, as called for in Agenda 2030,14 report on the progress it has 
                                                            
13 It is perhaps useful in this context briefly to discuss the increasing use of EODF for purposes that are not 
directly related to the conventional goal of laying a basic development foundation into countries to enable 
them to promote their own national development and contribute to various regional and global policy goals. 
Besides the allocations to climate-related purposes these non-conventional uses of EODF include, among 
others: fighting poverty in middle-income countries (MICs); undertaking projects linked to military 
interventions and peace-keeping; and paying for the cost of asylum-seekers from developing countries in 
industrial countries. These expenditures are, in many instances, aimed at addressing cross-border spillover 
effects of human neglect, war and conflict. They are thus GPG-related and should be charged to the budget of 
the concerned ministry/department of the ‘donor’ countries, like, for example, the ministry/department of 
defense, environment or interior and home security affairs. See, on these points: the OECD/DAC High Level 
Meeting Communiqué of 19 February 2016, which endorses the use of ODA for these various non-conventional 
purposes (available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/DAC-HLM-Communique-2016.pdf/)  ; for voices arguing for 
ODA to continue focusing on the least-developed countries and cooperation with  MICs to be funded from 
alternative sources, see, among others, Glennie (2011) and Tomasi (2015), as well as the categorization of 
‘development support’ suggested by Lin and Wang (2015).        
14 See on Agenda 2030 again note 2 above. 
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achieved in national capacity building and advancing towards the Agenda goals, 
including an overview of related expenditures, as and if appropriate, broken 
down by funding source. In contrast, IPCF should be programmed on an issue 
basis, for onward channeling to actors (countries, firms, civil society 
organizations, individual experts), who appear to be the relatively best providers 
for a particular input to the good to be produced.15        
 
To avoid inefficient intertwining of climate finance and development finance, it 
could also be useful to establish an OECD/DAC sister organization to which 
governments would report GPG-related expenditures, including climate finance 
allocations. 
  
Initially, in the early 1990s, when the growing importance of GPGs became 
increasingly apparent, it was perhaps a pragmatic move to address urgent global 
challenges by tapping ODA resources, but why does this practice continue? Why 
not recognize climate finance as distinct from development assistance?  
 
The next section provides one answer to this question. 
 
2 THE RISK OF MARKET AND STATE FAILURE IN ENSURING ADEQUATE CLIMATE 
FINANCING 
 
Standard economics assumes individual actors to be rational and selfish, 
primarily interested in improving their own material welfare. As such, they are 
predicted to free-ride on PGs, a behavior that is seen to cause markets to fail and 
potentially call for the state to step in with corrective action through its coercive 
powers of regulation and taxation. However, the institution of the state has no 
international equivalent. In fact, at the international level, states are also 
individual actors, and their representatives in international negotiations are 
likely to pursue national interests.  
 
Many scholars therefore assume that, just like any other individual actor, states 
are rational, primarily self-interested and, in the presence of GPGs, tempted to 
free-ride, notably when viewing the issue under negotiation as not a national 
priority. Put differently, GPGs are seen as facing the risk of dual (i.e., market and 
state) failure.  
 
                                                            
15 For a more detailed discussion on these resource allocation processes, see Kaul et al. (2015). 
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More recent research has shown that this risk, like the free-riding risk generally, 
may be overstated and that states are likely to be mixed-motive actors, possibly 
more so than individuals, because their policy positions tend to be a mixture of 
the interests of their various national constituencies. Moreover, states’ 
reluctance to cooperate can reflect not free-riding but a rejection of an 
agreement proposal perceived as unattractive.  
 
For a variety of reasons, then, dual-actor failure in the presence of GPGs may 
occur, especially concerning finance issues such as IPCF. A government may view 
national revenue as “theirs,” a good that they can mobilize, appropriate, and 
control in terms of the uses made of it. National public revenue is one of the 
power bases of states, but this has weakened in recent decades, as various tax 
rates have lowered, and states have relied on debt financing of their budgets 
(see, Ostry et al. 2015).  
 
Could these factors explain why, for example, many donor countries promise to 
move towards the 0.7 ODA target but repeatedly fail to do so and, in addition, 
even tug climate finance into the ODA envelope? 16 Or, why they are keen to 
mobilize private finance for climate purposes without precisely clarifying what 
the comparative advantages of different actor groups and funding sources in this 
field are? If discussed at all, the role of public finance that is mainly mentioned 
is that of catalyzing private finance. Yet, especially in policy areas such as climate 
change, which call for transformative change, states, individually and 
collectively, would need to play a pro-active, entrepreneurial role that goes far-
beyond leveraging private finance, however important, perhaps even 
indispensable this is.17 
 
Enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of climate finance might thus require 
further empirical and theoretical research aimed at developing an economic 
theory that explains under which conditions particular state and non-state actor 
groups contribute or fail to contribute to GPGs and what their comparative 
advantages are in their contribution to various types of financial and non-
                                                            
16 At the writing of this chapter, only five out of 29 OECD/DAC member states have met the ODA target of 0.7 
percent of their national income on a continuing basis. See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-history-of-
the-0-7-target.pdf/ . Yet, about 18 percent of total bilateral ODA (amounting to an annual average of US$ 25 
billion) were already flowing to climate-related initiatives in 2013-14. See 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Climate-related-dev-finance-ENG.pdf/ . This amount is 
relatively modest compared to the total amount of climate finance, which CPI (2015:1) estimates to amount to 
around US$ 390 billion in 2014. Therefore, its strategic use would be all the more important.     
17 On the role of the entrepreneurial state, see Mazzucato (2015). 
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financial inputs. The experiences such as those gained with public-private 
partnerships and the analyses of the current flows of climate finance, such as the 
limited amounts of resources so far allocated to adaptation purposes, suggest 
that the funders and their interests may matter: Neither private finance nor 
voluntary finance are perfect substitutes for public finance. It would thus be 
important systematically to clarify the specificity of the roles played by different 
actor groups in climate financing.  
 
In this context, it would also be important to reexamine the nature of 
international cooperation, notably multilateral (i.e., inter-state) cooperation, 
and to explore whether it is just the joint, collective endeavor (as we tend to 
view it) or whether it might be more appropriately viewed as a market 
transaction—an exchange between a country (group) A and a country (group) B, 
in which A’s commitment to reform is being traded against matching policy 
commitments and/or financial transfers to be provided by B. This question poses 
itself since, with the rising trend towards multi-polarity, conventional power 
politics is increasingly giving way to “smart power” politics. In light of this trend, 
it seems reasonable to conjecture that the top–down policy pressure that often 
enforced international agreements in the past is being replaced by exchange-
type interactions between states.  
 
Therefore, to what extent is international cooperation functioning as an 
international political market, and how efficient is this market?     
 
This brings us to the next issue. 
 
3 THE IMPORTANCE OF INTRA-GENERATIONAL FAIRNESS 
 
As Stern (2015) points out, many researchers, policymakers, and experts in the 
field of climate change emphasize concerns about inter-generational equity. Yet, 
so Stern, given that scientists warn us that corrective action is urgently required 
if we are to avoid crossing the 2˚ limit of global warming and, preferably, even 
stay below this threshold, strong emphasis must also, if not primarily, be placed 
on intra-generational equity within and across countries as a means of fostering 
the requisite willingness to contribute among all the concerned parties. This is 
especially urgent where actors’ preferences vary across countries and 
population groups (as is undoubtedly the case concerning many facets of climate 
change mitigation) and where decisive corrective action is required now (see also 
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Rübbelke 2011). In these cases, implementation strategies would need to aim at 
producing mixed-benefit results—clear near-term net benefits (e.g., clean-
energy security for all), which, as co-benefits, contribute to the “climate change 
mitigation” stock variable.  
 
We are living in a multi-polar world, and fairness and justice in international 
cooperation can no longer mean just offering any type of side-payment, a 
“carrot,” as game theorists say. Nor can it mean that the conventional powers 
wield “sticks” (another game theory term) such as trade sanctions that threaten 
to make non-compliance with a proposed agreement more expensive than 
compliance. Rather, current global power balances call for more systematic, 
transparent, and disaggregated cost–benefit assessments and, importantly, 
bargains that are perceived as worthwhile and fair—that get the “price” right.  
 
As Box 3 shows, each of the main cooperation strands—joint, collective action, 
and policy-commitment exchanges—involve several types of financial 
transaction that need to be calculated transparently and according to 
established fairness principles. This is especially important for exchanges where 
the suppliers of inputs are often developing countries and developed countries 
figure on the demand side as financiers. For bargains or sales to be concluded, it 
is important that the suppliers see that a reasonable amount of fairness has been 
factored into the prices being offered by the countries on the demand side of 
the bargain. Similarly, the “financiers” must have clear output indicators so that 
they can without too much effort or cost determine whether the good they 
financed is being delivered and meets all agreed-upon quantitative and 
qualitative criteria.  
 
Thus, fairness and enhanced contracting may have to move in tandem. 
 
Box 3 close to here 
 
Interestingly, as can be seen from the Agenda 2030 and the Paris Agreement,18 
we appear to have progressed further on indicators and result measurement 
than on fair pricing, considering that the very definition of “climate finance” has 
remained unsettled, incremental costs are often viewed as too complicated to 
determine, and considerable amounts of IPCF are being charged to ODA 
accounts. Expected results are usually being defined with great precision.  When 
                                                            
18 See, for the reference to the agreements again note 1 above. 
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it comes to finance, however, matters are left open-ended and vague. For 
example, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement just states that developed countries 
shall provide financial resources to developing countries in continuation of their 
obligations and encourages other parties to provide support voluntarily.      
 
Does this vagueness indicate that international political markets are suffering 
from conditions similar to those that make economic markets fail, such as power 
concentration and information asymmetries, and is the growing attention being 
paid to the formation of “clubs of the willing” introducing further distortions and 
preventing the enhanced efficiency in these international political markets that 
could come from pricing fairly and transparently and in a way that respects 
agreed-upon principles such as the CBDRRC principle?  
 
4 INTEGRATED PROVISION PATH ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Most of us might take for granted that a producer of a simple private good such 
as a pencil or paper clip had undertaken a production path analysis to determine 
the required inputs, from where best to procure them and when, and when and 
how to feed them in the production process. However, though innumerable 
studies have examined many relevant scientific, technological, economic, socio-
cultural, and ethical facets of GPGs, we still lack for these goods provision path 
sketches indicating, in broad-brush strokes, the major types of public/private 
and national/international inputs that might be required, their proper sequence, 
and the appropriate speed at which to move towards producing them.19  
 
Such a provision path sketch could serve several purposes. For example, it would 
clarify which actor groups might be best suited to provide which inputs, thus 
indicating the desirable balance between public and private finance. In this case, 
it would not be the availability or supply of certain types of money that would 
drive implementation. Rather, money would follow, and serve, the identified 
policy paths. 
                                                            
19 The report of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC 2014) is a case in point. It presents an impressive overview of the various facets of climate change 
mitigation but discusses them one-by-one without taking the next step of drawing up a provision path map. 
Other studies (e.g. Edenhofer et al. 2015) refer to the importance of creating links between various building 
blocks of the good but do not yet indicate what linking could entail. 
However, most of the more comprehensive provision path analyses take the form of graphs, as in Kaul et al. 
(2006) and Kaul et al. (2016), for example. Nevertheless, these studies, as well as many of those that provide 
micro-analyses of isolated facets of GPG provision provide a rich source that could be tapped to prepare more 
comprehensive provision path analyses, though some of the findings might need reexamination to ascertain 




Of course, preparing such sketches requires clear goal-setting. For example, 
should climate change mitigation be achieved primarily through scarcity 
management such as the establishment of quantitative global and national 
pollution-reduction targets or by aiming at goals like, for example, ‘clean-energy 
security for all’ or ‘equal access for all to opportunities for sustainable growth 
and development”? Obviously, clarifying the goal is the starting point of any 
provision path analysis, and the strategy chosen and financed will matter to 
intra-generational equity and the mobilization of the requisite willingness to 
cooperate and pay among all concerned parties. Is it, then, because of the still-
lacking process and output fairness that, despite the warnings that time is 
running out, climate governance is still highly fractured and haphazard?20      
 
Provision path sketches would also allow a systematic exploration of subsidiarity 
issues and the identification of opportunities for economies of scale and scope 
and for the more efficient use of non-rival goods such as green technology.21  
 
However, we lack provision path sketches not only for climate change mitigation 
and other GPGs but also for the existence of agents and agencies who could 
function as central nodes of what would in many cases be undoubtedly highly 
complex (i.e., multi-actor, multi-sector, multi-level) provision networks. Such an 
agent or agency would be required to change provision path analyses from being 
mere studies into a living document—an instrument for introducing a sense of 
direction into GPG production processes. In the field of climate change, such a 
facilitation mechanism exists for the political dimension (i.e., international 
negotiations) but not for the production dimension. This governance void needs 
to be filled.  
 
Recognizing GPGs, preparing GPG provision path sketches, appointing GPG 
network facilitators, and introducing “global” to national and international 
governance entities as a new organizational criterion could go a long way 
towards facilitating a more integrated and efficient implementation process, as 
well as an enhanced financing of these goods. While not involving any major 
change, it would introduce an important paradigm shift in research and 
                                                            
20 The notion of ‘process fairness’ refers to parties having an effective say in matters that concern them; and 
output fairness refers to the parties, who are involved in a cooperative effort, to consider the resulting policy 
output as fair. 
21 See, Stiglitz (2014) on the management of global knowledge stock; and Maskus and Reichman (2005) on 
technology transfer and the global intellectual property rights regime.   
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policymaking by replacing actors such as governments, states, firms, civil society, 
or individual households at the center of the analysis with the good, the policy 
outcome—the GPG to be achieved. This shift in focus would facilitate the often 
sorely lacking integration of the myriad dimensions that typically characterize 




This paper has explored whether there is added value in examining climate 
change mitigation and adaptation through the analytical lens of GPGs. The 
discussion indicates that this question can be answered in the affirmative.  We 
noticed, by looking through the analytical lens of GPGs, that international public 
climate finance (IPCF) and, thereby, overall climate finance seems to suffer from 
theoretical and institutional lock-in—a continued reliance on theories and policy 
practices that fit neither the GPG nature of climate change nor current 
policymaking realities. The discussion points to a rich agenda for further research 
and debate on how to improve the organization and governance of climate 
finance.  
 
The analysis also shows, however, that the constraints facing climate finance are, 
by and large, not climate-specific but GPG-specific, affecting GPG-type 
challenges across the board. Yet, a general theory of GPG provision and finance 
has not yet been developed.22  Therefore, it would seem useful to pursue a two-
pronged approach to overcoming the current lock-in problems: developing the 
incipient effort made in this paper to apply the GPG lens to climate issues while 
concurrently building a general theory of GPG provision and finance, which could 
offer robust policy advice on the cross-cutting institutional reforms that might 
be required. Such a two-pronged strategy suggests itself, because it seems 
unlikely that policymakers and other actors would support reform steps such as 
fairness or a mutually considerate and respectful exercise of national 
policymaking sovereignty in one particular issue area—say, climate—and not in 
other areas such as global health and finance, or managing the global natural 
commons, outer space, and cyber security.   
 
In fact, developing such a general theory of GPG provision could go a long way 
towards avoiding the risk of considering all financial resources, irrespective of 
their source, as mutually substitutable. It would allow us to determine more 
                                                            
22 Beginnings of such a theory can be found in: Atkinson 2006; Kaul et al. (2006); and Sandmo (2007.   
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clearly the specificity of the roles that different actors are best poised to assume 
in the provision process of a particular good. To be clear about that is especially 
important in today’s multi-actor, in which international cooperation endeavors 
such as climate change mitigation and adaptation can benefit from public, 
private and voluntary resource flows but in which the role of public finance, 
notably that of IPCF is especially important in order to ensure that the ultimate 
policy outcome is not only global-public in consumption and provision but also 
generally perceived as fair and just. 
 
Moreover, the time for developing a general GPG theory appears to be ripe. In 
most global-challenge areas, innumerable studies offer highly specialized micro-
analyses of a particular facet of a global challenge. Many of their insights will 
undoubtedly remain valid and provide a foundation on which to build further 
research. As many of their findings pertain only to either the national or 
international level, however, they may require reexamination from a GPG 
perspective, notably from the perspective of how to provide and finance GPGs 
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Box 1 – Defining public goods 
 
Public goods are goods whose properties are non-rival in consumption, non-excludable, or 
both. If a good has both properties, it is said to be “pure public;” if it has just one of these 
characteristics, it is referred to as “impure public.” 
Thus, public goods are defined as opposites of private goods, which, according to standard 
economic theory, are rival and excludable.  
However, being public or private is, in many cases, not an innate property of the good but 
a social construct, reflecting either a deliberate social choice or inaction due to a lack of 
scientific knowledge or information about the good.     
Accordingly, it seems useful to distinguish between goods that have the potential to be 
public in consumption and those that are actually in the public domain, as does the 
following two-tier definition: 
Definition 1: Goods have a special potential for being public if they are non-excludable 
and/or non-rival in consumption. 
Definition 2: Goods are de facto public if they are non-exclusive and available for all. 
The advantage of this definition is that it encourages analysts to ask whether and according 
to which criteria it is socially desirable for non-rival goods not to be fully or, at least, partially 
non-exclusive, for fully or partially rival goods to be non-excludable, and for potentially 
excludable goods to be left or placed in the public domain.  
 











Box 2 – Defining global public goods 
 
  
Global public goods (GPGs) share with other public goods (PGs) the key property of 
publicness in consumption: being fully or partially non-rival and non-excludable. What 
distinguishes them from other PGs is the reach of their publicness in consumption, which: 
(i) spans several geographic regions or even the globe as a whole; and may also (ii) penetrate 
into countries, areas beyond national jurisdictions, or both, with variable levels of impact; 
and (iii) be of long-term duration, affecting, for better or worse, several generations.  Thus, 
while criterion (i) is the prerequisite for a good to be defined as a GPG, the publicness in 
consumption of GPGs could potentially comprise three dimensions:  
  
o A spatial dimension: being of worldwide span;  
o An impact dimension: affecting countries and areas beyond national 
jurisdiction; o  A temporal dimension: having long-term effects.  
  
In most cases, global publicness in consumption along any of these three dimensions will 
not be an innate property of the good but reflect a policy choice or the lack thereof.  
  
In addition to being public in consumption, many GPGs, like other PGs, are also public in 
provision: their provision involves a large number of actors and compels countries to seek 
the cooperation of others.   
  
  
















Box 3 – Possible uses of international public climate finance 
 
 
International cooperation among states consists of two main sets of inter-action that 
tend to be supported by international public climate finance (IPCF): (1) national-level 
policy reform commitments by one country or set of countries in exchange for IPCF 
transfer commitments by others; and (2) joint efforts of countries in support of the 
production of intermediate GPG-type goods that require pooled IPCF financing. Each of 
these cooperation strands requires different financial mechanisms and characteristics, 
according to which the concerned parties may consider them as being in line with intra-
general fairness. 
 
1 Exchange-type transactions 
This type of transaction occurs when states meet each other on opposite sides of the 
international political market and seek to match the demand for and supply of domestic 
reform steps that would help generate inputs to a goal such as climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. The financing from the demand to the supply side could include 
• Incentive payments—provided to poorer developing countries to strengthen their 
national financial scope for undertaking mitigation-related domestic policy reform 
and capacity-building initiatives that would otherwise not be possible to the 
extent or at the speed that their external partners consider desirable from a 
global perspective 
• Compensatory finance—made available to poorer countries for domestic 
adaptation measures in line with the international commitments undertaken by 
the developed countries, including in …of the Paris Agreement (see UNFCCC 
2015). 
• Adequate pricing of climate-related goods and services—which can, in turn, take 
two forms: 
• Payments to a particular developing country for the generation of 
diffuse positive climate-related externalities (e.g., by preserving or 
expanding tropical-forest areas in its jurisdiction), provided on demand 
from the international community or parts thereof in excess of what the 
country would have done had it been motivated solely by its own 
national interests; these are also referred to as “reimbursements of 
incremental costs;” and 
• Payments for climate-related goods and services of a private good 
nature (e.g., certified emission reductions) provided by a developing 
country on demand from a particular other country. 
 
 
2  Collective production of intermediate regional or global public goods 
 
In this case, all interested countries would engage in the production of regional public 
goods (RPGs) and global public goods such as early warning and weather forecasting 
systems, research and development as well as deployment of knowledge and technology 
for facilitating the tackling of climate change-related and associated goals such as energy 
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security for all, or weather and crop insurance. The financial arrangements that might 
support such joint or collective endeavors could include 
• Cost-sharing arrangements—for which the cooperating parties would need to 
decide the most appropriate principle to follow: ability-to-pay, beneficiary/user 
to pay, or any other principle; 
• Pooled subsidy payments—from richer to poorer countries to enable the latter to 
establish national capacity and measures to access these goods; and 
• Pooled subsidy payments—from richer countries to third parties such as private 
insurance providers, to encourage them to offer differentiated prices so that 
poorer countries could also afford their insurance products.  
 
In respect to both, for each main type of transaction and each payment arrangement, it 
would be important to establish clear and transparent methods of calculating costs and 
benefits, as well as simple criteria and indicators that would allow policymakers and 
experts to determine whether a proposed transaction qualifies as a fair and mutually 
beneficial bargain. While precise cost–benefit calculations may sometimes be difficult, it 
should nevertheless be possible for the concerned parties to agree on payment and 
product-delivery arrangements that all perceive as “vaguely right” and hence acceptable, 
so that, in type 1 exchanges, bargains would be concluded and, for type 2 collective 
endeavors, the desired intermediate RPGs and GPGs would emerge as promptly and 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 











Multiple policy approaches, 
depending on the input to 
be provided and the 
implementation strategy 
chosen:  
o joint, collective 
international-level 
action (e.g. global 
norm setting or 
creating a co-
sponsored operational 
or finance mechanism) 
o quid-pro-quo exchange 
of national or regional 
policy reform 
commitments 
o market-type exchange 
involving national 
delivery of an input 






related loss and 
damage  
incurred by poorer 
countries   
 
Transfers of financial and 
non-financial resources 







One’s self and, in the case of 
mixed-motive or altruistic 
actors, possibly also future 




Developing countries,  
possibly also their poor 
people 
 





Fairness and justice in 
international negotiations 
and expectation of intra- 
and inter-generational 
outcome fairness plus 
willingness and capacity (i.e.  
development) on the part of 




provision of relevant GPGs, 
including climate change 
mitigation and adaptation 
Source: Author 
